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BOOK REVIEW
LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES. By James Willard
Hurst. Ithaca, N.Y., and London: Cornell University Press, 1977.
Pp. 318. $15.00.
Reviewed by James W. Ely, Jr. *
No student of American legal history can overlook the signifi-
cant work of J. Willard Hurst, who has been described as "the
foremost historian of American law."' A prolific author,2 Hurst has
been concerned primarily with the relationship between law and the
economic system. His most recent volume, Law and Social Order in
the United States, is an important contribution to the rapidly grow-
ing literature in the legal history field. Based upon the Carl L.
Becker Lectures that Hurst delivered at Cornell University in 1976,
the book ranges broadly over America's nineteenth- and twentieth-
century legal past, with emphasis upon law and social policy.
Throughout, the author is mindful of his own injunction: "Realistic
legal history must be a social history, pursuing law into whatever
relations it has had to the whole course of the society."3
Hurst treats four diverse topics: the range of United States legal
history, the power of legal agencies, science and public policy, and
the role of conflict and consensus in determining resource allocation.
Recognizing that he ventures into some inadequately investigated
areas, Hurst characterizes his purpose as being "to sketch subjects
that promise useful development." 4
Despite some qualifications,5 Hurst places himself squarely in
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1. Flaherty, An Approach to American History: Willard Hurst as Legal Historian, 14
AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 222 (1970). See Gordon, J. Willard Hurst and the Common Law Tradition
in American Legal Historiography, 10 LAW & Soc'y REV. 9 (1975); Murphy, Book Review, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 900 (1964); Scheiber, At the Borderland of Law and Economic History: The
Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 744 (1970).
2. Hurst is a Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin. His earlier works include
The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers (1950); Law and the Conditions of Freedom
in the Nineteenth-Century United States (1956); Law and Economic Growth: The Legal
History of the Lumber Industry in Wisconsin, 1836-1915 (1964); The Legitimacy of the Busi-
ness Corporation in the Law of the United States, 1780-1970 (1970); and A Legal History of
Money in the United States, 1774-1970 (1973).
3. J. HURST, LAW AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 42 (1977).
4. Id. at 6.
5. Hurst recognizes that an artificial consensus was achieved by excluding some groups,
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the consensus camp that has dominated much of American histo-
riography since World War I. He asserts that "people generally
have used law in a narrowly practical way" and have been
"concerned with law more as an instrument for desired immediate
results than as a statement of carefully legitimated, long-range val-
ues."' Yet what results did lawmakers almost invariably seek?
Hurst observes that "[s]ubstantial consensus existed also . . .
about values of the striving, business-oriented middle class."7 Thus,
the law promoted the creative will of individuals and manifested
confidence in the efficacy of bargaining to resolve most issues. More-
over, the quarrels between creditor and debtor, businessman and
agrarian, and management and labor occurred largely within a
middle-class context. The author points out that "[e]xcept for the
Civil War the country's politics never embraced a significant drive
for radical change in the institutions of power, though political po-
lemics sometimes borrowed the colorful language of class war."'
This broad consensus, with its reliance upon private initiative
and talent, influenced legal developments in many areas. The uni-
versal demand for fee simple titles to real property was irresistible
and rendered land monopoly impossible.9 Notwithstanding early
hostility to the corporate form of business organization, "a growing
consensus grew to see the corporate device as simply a handy, utili-
tarian instrument for doing business, which the community wel-
comed."'" Similarly, by the twentieth century the dominant view
was that corporate law should not regulate the exercise of corporate
power, but should leave this function to other statutes. On the other
hand, the author contends that lack of a consensus has hampered
governmental attempts to curtail the economic power of business.
Since the public associates rising productivity with large scale en-
terprise and depends upon business to create jobs, Hurst finds "no
evidence" that occasional criticism indicates "potential support for
antitrust action vigorous enough drastically to restructure an econ-
omy built around operations of large-scale firms."" Indeed, he con-
cludes that "antitrust law neither had prevented nor corrected the
such as Indians and blacks, who might have rejected or contested it. Thus, "the law of slavery
stood as a consensus of whites in slaveholding states." Id. at 219, 227.
6. Id. at 23.
7. Id. at 226.
8. Id. at 227.
9. For the failure of one attempt to resist the desire for fee simple ownership, see
Sutherland, The Tenantry on the New York Manors: A Chapter of Legal History, 41 CORNELL
L.Q. 620, 634-35 (1956).
10. HURST, supra note 3, at 240.
11. Id. at 260.
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existence of large concentrations of market power in private
hands.""
There was general agreement to rely upon market forces, the
private exchange of goods and services, to organize and adjust social
relationships. "From the late eighteenth century into the depression
of the 1930's," Hurst writes, "the prevailing consensus accepted
market processes as major means for allocating economic re-
sources.' 3 Of course, market values never dictated all policy deter-
minations. By the mid-twentieth century such nonmarket concerns
as national security, public health, and conservation increasingly
were advanced as qualifications on the private ordering of society.
Still, Hurst stresses that market goals remain very important in
American life. He recognizes that "public policy has accomplished




It has proved very difficult for the law to operate effectively outside
this middle-class consensus. The author concludes:
Drastic redistribution of wealth and income and unflinching enforcement of
civil rights legislation could deeply affect class alignments. But the lack of
politically effective demand for such changes ran too broad and deep in the
whole structure of the society to be attributed simply to the legal order. '
Hurst's emphasis upon the high degree of consensus in fashion-
ing American law runs counter to a recent volume by Morton J.
Horwitz. In The Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860, Hor-
witz contends that during the early nineteenth century commercial
groups secured "a disproportionate share of wealth and power in
American society" at the expense of farmers and workers. 6 This was
accomplished in large measure through the legal system, especially
the judiciary's reinterpretation of private law rules governing torts,
property, and contracts. Horwitz even asserts that the law "actively
promoted a legal redistribution of wealth against the weakest groups
in the society."' 7 This policy was dictated by the decision to hold
down governmental budgets and to promote enterprise by means
that avoided taxation. Where Horwitz sees conflict and a power grab
in the guise of legal norms, Hurst finds widespread agreement on
both the necessity and the modes of fostering economic growth. For
instance, Hurst maintains that during the nineteenth century
"government found it impracticable to command sizable resources
12. Id. at 263-64.
13. Id. at 234.
14. Id. at 269.
15. Id. at 65.
16. M. HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERIcAN LAw, 1780-1860, at xvi (1977).
17. Id. at 254.
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by taxation in a chronically cash-scarce economy." 8 One can hardly
be surprised, then, at policies designed to muster private talent and
capital. A full assessment of the differences between Hurst and
Horwitz cannot be undertaken here, but rather clearly Horwitz does
not share Hurst's opinion about the impact of a widely shared faith
in the market as the key to economic development.
The author rightly highlights the significance of unplanned
events that often affect the uses of law and the course of social
policy. Thus, foreign immigration in the nineteenth century and the
northward migration of blacks in the twentieth century profoundly
influenced the nature of urban problems. Hurst observes that the
growth of cities, "rather than being a chosen policy, thrust upon
policy makers a host of unwanted problems in providing service and
regulation." 9 Similarly, the abundance of natural resources in
North America encouraged a belief that supplies were limitless, a
view that continues to hamper legal efforts to protect the environ-
ment or to conserve energy.
The most striking area in which the drift of events simply over-
whelmed legal processes is the outpouring of technological develop-
ments. Hurst expresses concern that "the pace, variety, and depth
of changes largely based on uses of the products of science and
technology outran our capacity for directed intelligence in social
relations."20 Legal regulations, for example, lagged far behind the
introduction of the automobile. Yet mass use of the automobile
contributed to the growth of suburbs, required a great expenditure
on highways, undermined public transportation, created the prob-
lem of adjusting the costs of accidents, and rendered national em-
ployment dependent on the manufacture of vehicles. None of this
was the result of deliberate policy, but reflected reliance upon the
market to order priorities. Here, as in other fields, courts and legis-
latures have been left to struggle with the consequences of technol-
ogy.21' Even more ominous is the extent to which "various products
of scientific and technical development have tended steadily to
erode the relative capacities of private ability to withstand official
might. '22 Hurst contends that governmental power to invade pri-
vacy or to intimidate political opponents has increased dangerously
18. HuasT, supra note 3, at 167.
19. Id. at 64.
20. Id. at 213.
21. See, e.g., County Bd. of Arlington County v. Richards, 98 S. Ct. 24 (1977) (restric-
tions on commuter parking); Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 56 U.S.L.W. 3258 (U.S. Oct. 17, 1977) (enforcement of transportation controls).
22. HURST, supra note 3, at 210.
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by virtue of electronic surveillance and data-gathering techniques
and now threatens the basis of constitutionalism.
Hurst also gives considerable attention to the exercise of judi-
cial power, a topic of intense debate in recent years. Concurring with
Alexander Hamilton that the judiciary is "the least dangerous
branch, ' 23 Hurst declares that "for the judges to have lasting effect,
their decisions either must be withdrawn from areas of broad contro-
versy or must accord with deep and powerful currents of values in
the society. ' 2 Pointing out that the impact of judicial decisions is
difficult to determine, the author cautions that one must not exag-
gerate the effects of judicial review. By invalidating state and fed-
eral statutes between 1880 and 1930, for example, courts employed
"a kind of delaying veto," but rarely blocked any sustained com-
munity goal. 5 Supreme Court decisions striking down the federal
income tax and New Deal legislation, for instance, eventually were
reversed through the political process. Moreover, Hurst asserts that
the great nineteenth-century age of the common law, in which
judges were prime lawmakers, has ended. Judicial time increasingly
is occupied with the interpretation of statutes and rules, and judges
act within policies set out by legislators. The author states that "the
twentieth century has witnessed an apparently permanent shift
toward dominance of legislative and executive-administrative over
judicial policy making.
'26
In reaching this conclusion Hurst fails to examine, and im-
pliedly rejects, recent literature that strongly argues that the federal
courts have overstepped their bounds and that they exercise power
inconsistent with a democratic society. In essence, critics allege that
since 1960 federal courts have expanded the doctrine of standing to
accommodate more litigants, have sought to pass upon matters bet-
ter governed politically, and have substituted their own view of
appropriate policy for that of legislative bodies.27 The late Alexander
M. Bickel observed that "[a]ll too many federal judges have been
induced to view themselves as holding roving commissions as prob-
lem solvers, and as charged with a duty to act when majoritarian
institutions do not. '" Moreover, the character of judicial relief has
23. THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (A. Hamilton).
24. HURST, supra note 3, at 100.
25. Id. at 92.
26. Id. at 143.
27. See L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY DECREE: THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON RACE AND
THE SCHOOLS 14-15, 258-62 (1976); P. KURLAND, PoIrrsCS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN
Cou'r xxi-xxii, 172-206 (1970); Glazer, Towards an Imperial Judiciary, in THE AMERICAN
COMMONWEALTH 104 (N. Glazer & I. Kristol eds. 1976).
28. A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 134 (1970).
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changed significantly. Courts are less content to declare unconstitu-
tional statutes void and increasingly tell the legislative and execu-
tive branches what actions they must take. Perhaps the most strik-
ing evidence of this philosophy is the recent line of decisions that
reorganize governmental services and institutions and impose fiscal
and tax policies upon popularly elected officials.2"
Hurst never comes to grips with this question. He briefly dis-
cusses the concept of judicial self-restraint, grounded in the doc-
trines of standing and mootness, but neglects to note the extent to
which such limitations eroded during the Warren Court years." The
author states that the legislature, through its power to tax and
appropriate, has the primary responsibility to allocate societal re-
sources. The doctrine denying taxpayers standing to challenge the
validity of federal expenditures was calculated to shield the spend-
ing power from judicial scrutiny. Although historically accurate and
doubtless retaining a large measure of vitality, Hurst's emphasis
upon the legislative authority to set priorities by appropriation re-
quires qualification. As noted above, courts increasingly are more
willing to mandate expenditures. Hurst's traditional view of the
judicial role may be explained by his preoccupation with law and
economic policy. Since the 1930's this has not been a major area of
activity for the courts, and indeed judges apply "a strong presump-
tion of constitutionality to economic regulatory legislation." 3'
Hence, the author does not treat at length those fields of social and
educational policy in which the federal courts have been active, and
this omission influences his judgment.
Whereas Hurst sees the judiciary as the least powerful branch
of government, he rightly stresses the marked rise in executive au-
thority during the twentieth century. The distrust of executive
power, inherited from the colonial period, slowly gave way after
1800. Although nineteenth-century presidents such as Jackson and
Lincoln occasionally expanded the executive role and thereby cre-
ated precedents for future application, the emergence of the modern
presidency really dates from the Progressive Era before World War
29. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 97 S. Ct. 2749 (1977); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp.
781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
James v. Wallace, 406 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd in part sub nom. Newman v.
Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1977), See also Cox, The New Dimensions of Constitutional
Adjudication, 51 WASH. L. REv. 791, 813-21 (1976).
30. For discussions of the erosion of the doctrines of standing and mootness, see Cox,
supra note 29, at 803-13; Mendelson, Mr. Justice Douglas and Government by the Judiciary,
38 J. POL. 918, 921-37 (1976).
31. HURST, supra note 3, at 93.
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I. The rapid growth of the federal bureaucracy and the establish-
ment of independent regulatory agencies strengthened executive
power and "put in question Congress's capacity significantly to de-
termine national public policy. 32 Indeed, Congress began to dele-
gate large areas of policy determination to the President. 3 Two
world wars and the prolonged tensions of the Cold War completed
this transformation of the presidency. Foreign policy and national
security concerns since 1940 have made it easy for presidents to
extend the reach of their office. "Wars and threats of war, after all,"
James T. Patterson maintains, have "been primary causes of expan-
sion in presidential power." 34 Congress and the courts have proved
particularly reluctant to check the exercise of presidential war
power.35 While few would fault Hurst's outline of the growth of exec-
utive authority, one must observe that it is hardly a novel analysis.
Hurst is concerned about several aspects of this development.
First, he contends that the Watergate affair was symptomatic of "a
dangerous insulation of the executive office of the President that
had been developing since the 1930's."1 Second, although the Su-
preme Court has rejected the concept of inherent presidential
power 7 and unlimited executive privilege,38 Hurst doubts that this
will prove sufficient to check a strong-minded President. President
Truman in 1952 and President Nixon in 1974 enjoyed low public
esteem and could not muster support in Congress. Consequently, it
was politically impossible for them to defy court decrees.39 Would
the judiciary necessarily be able to secure compliance from a popu-
lar chief executive? Hurst is pessimistic: "[T]he record of strong
presidential initiatives taken under the claim of stewardship gives
ground for questioning how far future Presidents will obey the
Court, if events press them hard."4 To the author, the executive is
32. Id. at 147.
33. Hurst declares:
In the 1970's, after some forty years of this course of events, it was evident that the future
vitality of the Congress would depend largely on Congress's capacity to delegate with
more care and caution and to use its great investigative authority to hold its chief
delegate under effective scrutiny.
Id. at 150.
34. Patterson, The Rise of Presidential Power Before World War II, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 39, 55-56 (1976).
35. Washy, The Presidency Before the Courts, 6 CAP. U.L. REv. 35, 42-44 (1976).
36. HURST, supra note 3, at 149.
37. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (1952).
38. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-16 (1974).
39. For an account of the steel seizure crisis, see M. MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL
SEIZURE CASE: THE LiMiTs OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER (1977).
40. HURST, supra note 3, at 104. Although no President has ever disobeyed a direct
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clearly the dominant branch.
Hurst's study certainly suggests avenues for additional re-
search. His discussion of the relation between the legal system and
technology is particularly noteworthy. Yet in other respects this
volume is disappointing. Few of the historical interpretations are
original; instead, most reflect conclusions reached by Hurst in the
1950's. As in his other works, the author almost entirely ignores
colonial law. Although economic issues receive sustained and skill-
ful treatment, Hurst's handling of other problems is both skimpy
and superficial. The author appears uneasy in presenting the civil
rights litigation under the fourteenth amendment and rarely ven-
tures beyond conventional liberal platitudes. Hurst's claim that
nineteenth-century courts defeated "the more extensive grant origi-
nally intended" under the fourteenth amendment to protect blacks"
is open to serious question. His conclusion is directly contradicted
by Raoul Berger, who in his recently published Government by
Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment em-
phasizes the limited aims of the framers of the fourteenth amend-
ment.12 Moreover, Hurst's assessment of post-1960 civil rights deci-
sions seemingly contradicts his stress upon law operating within a
consensus framework. It would be difficult to demonstrate much
agreement in favor of racial busing or employment quotas.
Similarly, the author's views on the role of violence in American
history are developed inadequately. He asserts that in some areas,
notably race and labor relations, "law condoned, consciously ac-
cepted, or showed consistent neglect or indifference toward use of
private violence to allocate benefits and burdens, privileges and
deprivations."4 3 At the same time, Hurst sees "a legitimate monop-
oly of force" as an essential attribute of the legal system." Further,
judicial order, Franklin D. Roosevelt privately threatened defiance, and Lincoln disregarded
a writ of habeas corpus issued by Chief Justice Roger Taney. R. SCIOLIANO, THE SUPREME
CouRT AND THE PRESIDENCY 39-51 (1971).
41. HURST, supra note 3, at 100.
42. Berger concludes:
The historical records all but incontrovertibly establish that the framers of the Four-
teenth Amendment excluded both suffrage and segregation from its reach; they confined
it to protection of carefully enumerated rights against State discrimination, deliberately
withholding federal power to supply those rights where they were not granted by the
State to anybody, white or black. This was a limited-tragically limited-response to
the needs of blacks newly released from slavery; it reflected the hagridden racism that
held both North and South in thrall; nonetheless, it was all the sovereign people were
prepared to do in 1868.
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
407 (1977).




he states that the "working norms" of society include a "high regard
for peaceful order."45 The author understates the long American
tradition of extra-legal force to maintain order, supplement law
enforcement, and discipline those on the fringe of society. Indeed,
much American violence has been apolitical or conservative, not
insurrectionary, in character, representing clashes between religious
and ethnic groups or directed against those perceived as threats to
the community." Although agreeing with Hurst that violence is an
appropriate concern for legal historians, this reviewer finds his
treatment of the subject abbreviated and potentially misleading.
Despite some limitations, Law and Social Order in the United
States provides a useful introduction to Hurst's views. The author
is concerned with defining a framework for American legal history
and is unafraid to offer broad hypotheses. Although some of Hurst's
conclusions may prompt dissent, this volume should prove of inter-
est to both specialists and general readers.
45. Id. at 57.
46. See R. BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HISTORICAL STUDIES OF VIOLENCE AND
VIGILANTISM 4-5, 16-36, 93-235 (1975); Ely, Negro Demonstrations and the Law: Danville as
a Test Case, 27 VAND. L. REV. 927 (1974).
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